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CTL approach to domain with imbalanced class distributions; 2) the creation of a new 




























Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 














Associate Professor Michel Cukier, Chair 
Professor Dana Nau 
















© Copyright by 


















Thank to my advisor, Prof Cukier, for your guidance.  One of the hardest 
things for a mentor to do is to know when not to give directed guidance to a 
subordinate.  Yet Prof Cukier excels in this role. Prof Cukier always allowed me to 
make my own epiphanies.  Even though it felt at times he was giving me enough rope 
to hang myself, he was always there to prevent me from drowning.   
Thank you to my committee members for you time and patience.  To Prof 
Lise Getoor and Prof Dana Nau, I started graduate school primarily interested in 
systems and security, but after your classes I have gravitated toward more artificial 
intelligence fields.   
Thank you to the working group from the UMD Cybersecurity club, who 
helped give me different perspectives on how hackers may behave in different 
contexts.  Our dialogue provided valuable insight into this work.   
Thank you to all the Soldiers and officers with whom I have served.  The list 
is too long to write.   
Thank you to my family.  None of this is possible without you.  My father, 
hardest working person I know, my mother the most patient woman I know, and my 
wife the strongest woman I have ever met.    
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
Overview ................................................................................................................... 1 
The Threat ................................................................................................................. 2 
Motivation for Researching Stealth Scanning .......................................................... 3 
Motivation for Studying Network Flow Metadata.................................................... 4 
Objectives ................................................................................................................. 4 
Experimental Overview ............................................................................................ 5 
Contributions............................................................................................................. 6 
Organization .............................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter 2: Background and Related Works.................................................................. 8 
Network FlowData .................................................................................................... 8 
Scanning .................................................................................................................. 11 
Challenges with Machine Learning in Intrusion Detection .................................... 12 
Challenges with Intrusion Detection Datasets ........................................................ 15 
Previous Semi-Supervised Learning Work ............................................................. 19 
Previous Scan Detection Work ............................................................................... 20 
Chapter 3: Method ...................................................................................................... 22 
 v 
 
Supervised Classifier .............................................................................................. 22 
Unsupervised Clustering ......................................................................................... 24 
Semi-Supervised Method ........................................................................................ 25 
Cluster-then-label Analysis ..................................................................................... 28 
Error Performance ............................................................................................... 28 
Practical Issues .................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 4: Dataset ....................................................................................................... 34 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 34 
Paradigm Development ........................................................................................... 34 
Network Configuration ........................................................................................... 37 
Data Preprocessing.................................................................................................. 39 
Feature Set .......................................................................................................... 39 
Data Auditing ...................................................................................................... 41 
Chapter 5:  Experiment ............................................................................................... 44 
Experimental Parameters ........................................................................................ 44 
Experimental Evaluation ......................................................................................... 47 
CTL Implementation ............................................................................................... 49 
Chapter 6:  Results and Discussion ............................................................................. 50 
Chapter 7: Conclusions ............................................................................................... 63 





List of Tables 
Table 1: Basic Network Flow Record Information....................................................... 9 
Table 2: Conditions for Network Flow Expiration ..................................................... 10 
Table 3: Percentage of Services Discovered ............................................................... 36 
Table 4: Typical Port Scan Settings ............................................................................ 36 
Table 5: November Dataset Characteristics ................................................................ 38 
Table 6: December Dataset Characteristics ................................................................ 38 
Table 7: January Dataset Characteristics .................................................................... 39 
Table 8: Record Key ................................................................................................... 39 
Table 9: Features of Basic Flow Characteristics ......................................................... 40 
Table 10: Features over All Destination Ports ............................................................ 40 
Table 11: Feature on Individual Destination Ports ..................................................... 40 
Table 12: Experimental Parameters over Supervised Trial Cases .............................. 45 
Table 13: Experimental Parameters over CTL Trial Cases ........................................ 46 
Table 14: Experimental Parameters over CTL Control Cases .................................... 47 
Table 15: Classification Matrix .................................................................................. 49 
Table 16: Supervised Trials ........................................................................................ 50 




List of Figures 
Figure 1: Targeting Cycle ............................................................................................. 3 
Figure 2: Experimental Phases...................................................................................... 6 
Figure 3: Example Nfdump Output ............................................................................ 10 
Figure 4: RIPPER Pseudocode ................................................................................... 24 
Figure 5: RIPPER Metrics and Heuristics .................................................................. 24 
Figure 6: Cluster-Then-Label Algorithm .................................................................... 26 
Figure 7: a) Omniscient view of two classes, b) the whole set of labeled instances, c) 
the set of labeled and unlabeled instances .................................................................. 29 
Figure 8: Margin-cluster Density Relationship........................................................... 29 
Figure 9: An Example Population Consisting of Four Clusters  ................................ 32 
Figure 10: Hierarchical Clustering in Example Population  ....................................... 32 
Figure 11: Network Setup ........................................................................................... 38 
Figure 12 Embedded Scan (source and target IP obscurred and masked) .................. 43 
Figure 13: Performance Measures .............................................................................. 48 
Figure 14: Performance of CTL Classifiers with Different Amounts of Labeled Data
..................................................................................................................................... 51 
Figure 15: Improvement from December Trial H (1 % Labeled) ............................... 52 
Figure 16: Improvement from December Trial C(75% Labeled) ............................... 52 
Figure 17: Improvement from December Trial I (Top 30 Non-scanner, Top 5 
Scanners Labeled) ....................................................................................................... 53 
Figure 18: Improvement from December Trial J (1 % random with injected attack 
traffic labeled) ............................................................................................................. 53 
 viii 
 
Figure 19: Proportions of Training and Test Set Traffic per Cluster .......................... 54 
Figure 20: Proportions of Training and Test Set Scan Traffic per cluster .................. 55 
Figure 21: Proportions of Training and Test Set Scan Traffic per Cluster (Scaled 
Between 0 To 2500) .................................................................................................... 55 
Figure 22: Performance of a Two-stage Classifier ..................................................... 62 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview 
Computer and network security is at the forefront in the minds of corporate 
and government leaders.  Information technology permeates seemingly every aspect 
of our lives.  Consequently, both public and private sector leaders have invested 
tremendous amounts of money into developing better protection.  Numerous studies 
have created classification techniques that have asserted promising results. 
Theoretically, these techniques could be used in an intrusion detection system to 
identify malicious traffic.  Yet, despite considerable investment into research for 
protection of our computer and network assets, there has been a lack of significant 
artificial intelligence and machine learning application into real-world intrusion 
detection. Due to the lack of pragmatic machine learning approaches in intrusion 
detection, security administrators are limited to signature-based methods and manual 
processes, which are both error prone and easy to evade.  While attackers are growing 
in sophistication, the security community is struggling to keep pace. 
This thesis explores semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) and data mining 
techniques in the context of network intrusion detection in an effort to address these 
domain specific challenges. Through a series of controlled and focused experiments, 
this research attempts to understand how to improve network intrusion detection.  
Specifically, this thesis focuses on stealth network reconnaissance, a particular subset 
of malicious activity. By focusing on this specific attack paradigm, we create a 
cleaner dataset and avoid some of the pitfalls of previous research.  Additionally, this 
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research analyzes lightweight network flow data, a form of metadata.  Based on the 
results of this work, we demonstrate that, although there are still some significant 
challenges, cluster-then-label (CTL) semi-supervised machine learning can be 
employed with performance comparable to supervised learning in certain settings.  
That being stated, practical considerations may limit how effective a CTL approach 
can be in a real world setting. 
One of the background motivations for this study was Symons's and Beaver's 
idea of penetration testing your own network to train a tailor-made SSL classifier [1]. 
A cost-effective method for developing a tailor-made classifier addresses two specific 
problems in intrusion detection: the enormous variability among different networks 
and the rapidly changing nature of attack paradigms.  In a practical security setting, a 
semi-supervised learner would train on a small set of labeled network logs, which a 
network administrator would audit, as well as the complete set of unlabeled network 
logs.  This training would produce a network specific classifier, which would be 
sensitive to the particular characteristics and protocols of that network.  Furthermore, 
if this method is proven feasible, then new attack paradigms, for instance a new 
paradigm that is reported on a hacker convention, could be injected into regular 
traffic, thus building a classifier that can keep pace with the latest attack trends.  
The Threat 
Network scanning is an integral part of the attack paradigm; it enables 
attackers to perform the reconnaissance necessary to identify potential targets and 
courses of actions to achieve their ultimate objectives.  Scanning is typically the first 
part of the targeting cycle; thus, if a security administrator has warning of scanning, 
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then that administrator should be more focused on the targeted assets (see Figure 1).  
Furthermore, if there is an indication of scanning that demonstrates a high level of 
skill on the part of an attacker, then the security administrator should be even more 
alarmed.  Sophisticated and well-funded attackers have the resources to conduct 
stealthy reconnaissance over the period of days, and often send network probes at 
such a low rate that it is infeasible for an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect 
probing activity within a reasonable time window.   
 
Figure 1: Targeting Cycle 
Motivation for Researching Stealth Scanning  
 While scanning does not directly harm the availability or integrity of a 
computer system, there are several properties that make it significant.  First, detecting 
scans that last over a long time period is laborious.  It is typically a manual process 
assisted by some signature-based querying.  As a result, the process is error prone. 
Security administrators often ignore scanning due to these challenges.  Automated 
methods that perform better than signatures or other ad hoc techniques can help 
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alleviate this burden.  Second, scanning is usually the first part of the targeting cycle.  
Therefore, if a network defender had knowledge of scanning, the defender would be 
better able to prioritize and sort subsequent alarms that correspond to activities related 
to other parts of the targeting cycle.  Third, since stealth scanning does not trigger 
conventional automated methods, such as an IDS, stealth scanning is largely 
undocumented in existing labeled datasets.  In addition, there is a general lack of 
documentation on how to exactly perform stealth scanning.  Finally, scanning is a 
good starting point to conduct realistic experiments on a live network.  Since 
scanning does not directly harm network resources, experiments can be implemented 
without extensive investment.  Once a technique has been validated for scanning, it 
can then be applied to more intrusive portions of the targeting cycle.   
Motivation for Studying Network Flow Metadata 
 Network flow metadata is important for several reasons.  First, network flow 
data is ubiquitous.  Almost all routers produce network flow records.  In certain 
situations, a security administrator performing network forensics may only have 
network flow data available to analyze.  Second, network flow data requires order of 
magnitudes less storage than other network log data such as packet capture (PCAP).  
This smaller footprint means logs can be stored for a longer period.  Finally, the more 
network protocols use encryption, the more network defenders will need techniques 
that can infer attacks without relying on deep packet inspection of packet’s payload.       
Objectives 
This thesis aims to address the following questions: 
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1. Does previously established scan detection techniques perform well on a 
specific set of malicious data (stealth scanning) produced on a real production 
network? This question aims to determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
previous approaches, and to gauge how the network environment affects the 
techniques. If a previous approach works well, it can be used as a basis of 
comparison for new techniques. 
2. Do semi-supervised methods perform comparably to supervised methods?  
The objective of this question is to show whether semi-supervised methods 
can perform as well or potentially better than supervised methods, while using 
a fraction of the required effort. 
3. Do any of these techniques show promise in a practical network intrusion 
detection setting?  As this thesis will show, network intrusion detection has 
some unique challenges that require specific attention in order for an 
implementation to be successful.     
Experimental Overview 
Figure 2 illustrates the main phases of the study.  Before any analysis of a 
classifier could be performed, this study had to develop and catalog attack paradigms, 
build a dataset, and audit that dataset for errors.  After the data was properly audited 





Figure 2: Experimental Phases 
 
Contributions 
 There are three main contributions to this research.  First, it validates previous 
work.  Too often intrusion detection studies are neither validated nor replicated and 
this lack of scientific rigor results in limited real world applicability.  This lack of 
validation is further exacerbated by the changing nature of network technology.  
What may work today, may be ineffective or impractical tomorrow.  Second, this 
work has produced a clean, labeled dataset that was built in a transparent and 
controlled manner.  There is a critical lack of labeled datasets in intrusion detection.  
Furthermore, this thesis clearly lays out how the experiment was conducted so that 
other researchers can perform similar studies in an effort to replicate and reproduce 
results. In addition, steps have been taken to make this dataset publically available.  
Finally, to our knowledge, this thesis is the first dedicated study on using CTL SSL 
techniques to detect a specific subset of malicious activity, and one of the few studies 
on SSL in intrusion detection.  The results of this study document potential issues 
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with a SSL implementation in intrusion detection and other application domains 
where there is an imbalance in class distributions.   
Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, relevant 
background concepts and previous works are explained.  Chapter 3 describes the 
methods employed in this experiment. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the dataset.  
Chapter 5 describes the experimental parameters for the trials.  Chapter 6 analyzes the 
trial results with insight to practical application issues.  Chapter 7 summarizes this 
thesis and provides recommendations for future work.    
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Works 
Network FlowData 
Network flow data is metadata about network based transactions between 
pairs of endpoints in a network.  The heart of network flow data is the concept of an 
IP flow, which is a set of similar packets observed on a certain point and time in a 
network, going from one source host to one destination host.  A flow record 
summarizes the pertinent characteristics from the IP flow (see Table 1).  Typically, a 
router will record IP flow records and then export them to a server for storage.  For 
most network transactions between two endpoints, the transaction is bidirectional, so 
the router or observation point will record two flows.  For instance, when a client 
browses to a web server, a router collecting network flows will record two flow 
records: one that describes the set of packets from the client to the server and one in 
the reverse direction.  A network flow log is a flat collection of network flow records.  
Administrators use network flow data for a variety of purposes including billing, 
network monitoring, capacity planning, security analysis, and data mining [2].   
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Table 1: Basic Network Flow Record Information 
Field Remarks 
Time Timestamp of when flow began 
Duration The length of the flow in milliseconds 
Source IP address The TCP/UDP port number of the source socket 




Destination port The TCP/UDP port number of the destination socket 
OSI Layer 3/4 
Protocol 
Layer 3 Protocol used. For IPv4, typically the layer 4 protocol 
is specified (TCP/UDP)  
Router interface The interface on which the packet entered 
TCP Flags If TCP, this field is the union of all the TCP flags seen 
Number of packets  
Number of bytes  
 
Some aspects of network flow data are important to understand in order to 
analyze network communications.  A flow record is created whenever the observing 
device sees a unique IP address port combination.  Thus, a single communication 
graph between two endpoints could have multiple flow records if the network 
communication involves multiple layer 7 protocols (i.e. spans multiple ports).  The 
observing device records what it sees from the packet’s header and typically does not 
have any enhanced security features to detect spoofing.  Therefore, security analysts 
need to be cognizant that attackers may have the ability to obfuscate themselves in 
certain attacks.  In addition, a router may produce a flow record if any of the 
conditions in Table 2 are met.  As a result, proper analysis must account for 
premature segmentation of flows.              
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If a host sends a FIN or RST flag on a TCP connection, the flow will 
be terminated [2]. 
Inactivity If the flow is inactive for some predefined threshold, the flow is 
terminated [2].  Default for NetFlow is 15 seconds [3].  
Long flows If the flow continues to be active longer than a prefunded threshold, 
the flow is terminated [2].  Default for NetFlow is 30 minutes [3]. 
Memory 
exhaustion 
Depending on the implementation, a router may prematurely close a 
flow record, if it is low on memory.  By default NetFlow will expire 
30 flow records prior to its cache hitting maximum capacity [3].   
 
It is worth noting that the term “network flow” refers to a family of similar 
protocols.  Cisco pioneered the field with their priority format NetFlow.  NetFlow 
version 9 is the basis for the open IETF standard IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) 
protocol.  Despite the existence of a multitude of priority formats, each format is 
similar enough that a technique developed on one will tend to work with other vendor 
formats.  In other words, the network flow techniques will work on all formats as 
long as the technique is limited to the information in Table 1 and it does not rely on 
any user-defined fields.  This thesis used NetFlow version 5 through the nfdump 
toolset.  An example output from nfdump is show in Figure 3. 
 




This research focuses on port scanning, a specific subset of network 
reconnaissance.  Scanning covers a range of activities by which attackers attempt to 
gain information about a target network and its hosts.  Attackers typically perform 
initial discovery of hosts through ping scans (“ping sweeps”), reverse-DNS 
resolution, and ports scans.  Port scans attempt to reach open TCP and UDP services 
on hosts.  In the case of TCP scans, various header flags may be set to gauge how the 
network and hosts are configured to respond.  After initial scans, an attacker may 
employ more interactive scripts to ascertain specific vulnerabilities in protocols or 
how the server is implemented.  This activity, known as vulnerability scanning, varies 
in level of how invasive it is to the host machine and has a different traffic profile 
from port scanning.  In addition to information about services hosted, attackers can 
use ping scans, port scans, and vulnerability scans to infer OS version, network 
configuration and other information [4]. 
While scanning can take many forms, most researchers categorize port scans 
into two basic categories based on the scan’s intended target footprint: horizontal 
scans and vertical scans [5].  Horizontal scans refer to scans where an attacker seeks 
to gain information on a range of hosts on a network: which ones are accessible, what 
services they hosts, what version of a protocol, etc.  Vertical scans refer to scans 
where an attacker seeks to gain information about a specific host.  These scans 
typically include a greater range of ports and protocols targeted, and they may include 
other reconnaissance techniques to infer OS build, poor protocol configurations, etc.  
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An understanding of each scan type and their purpose provides insight on how 
available network record sources can be processed and minded to detect this activity.  
Challenges with Machine Learning in Intrusion Detection 
Machine learning, despite successful application in other areas, has had 
difficulty in being adopted in practical network intrusion detection (NID) settings.  
Many studies fail to recognize fundamentally how machine learning algorithms work 
and their underlying assumptions.  Furthermore, some unique aspects of classifying 
network traffic make it a dramatically different task than other applications such as 
classifying spam or optical character recognition (OCR).   In addition, intrusion 
detection has the added problem of an adversary community that constantly seeks 
ways to tune attacks and evade detection [6].  Understanding these idiosyncrasies is 
critical to understanding how to apply machine learning techniques more effectively. 
One of the most frequent flaws in machine learning applied to NID is 
assuming that novel attacks will be detected given a large dataset of known activity 
[6]. On the surface, machine learning algorithms can classify instances as “abnormal” 
vs. “normal” or “malicious” vs. “benign”; however, the algorithms require 
“abnormal” or “malicious” training experience to develop a classifier that generalizes 
well.  If the datasets on which the algorithm is trained does not contain representative 
samples of attacks, then the resultant classifier may be inadequate.  As Sommer and 
Paxson assert, studies often wind up “training an anomaly detection system with the 
opposite of what it is supposed to find…it requires having a perfect model of 
normality for any reliable decision” [6].  This idea is referred to as the “closed world 
assumption”; the idea of specifying only positive examples and adopting a standing 
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assumption that the rest are negative [6].  As a consequence of this misunderstanding, 
the trained classifiers often do not generalize adequately in future settings. 
There are some particular aspects of NID that can make a naive 
implementation of a machine-learned classifier ill-posed.  NID is an area of study that 
is plagued by the base-rate fallacy [7].  Since the proportion of benign traffic is order 
of magnitudes larger than the proportion of malicious traffic, many studies fail to 
highlight that while the accuracy of a detection scheme is ostensibly high, for instance 
95%, its performance will be poor in practice.  This apparent incongruent is due to the 
detection scheme generating orders of magnitude more false positive alarms than true 
positive alarms.  Consequently, in order for a detection scheme to be of practical use, 
it must detect at an extremely high accuracy, which for a learning algorithm may 
require an infeasible amount of training data and may not generalize outside of the 
network on which the learning algorithm trained. 
The costs of classification errors in NID are much higher than in other 
domains.  Other areas where applications have been successful demonstrate error 
tolerance (like recommending products for e-commerce).  In these domains, making a 
classification error has a negligible impact.  In NID, the impacts of errors are 
extreme; false positives can result in a significant waste of time, false negatives in 
compromised computer systems [6].  Alerts for scanning in particular are full of false 
positive alarms.  The base-rate fallacy further exacerbates the situation, because users 
of a system will quickly lose faith if they waste all of their time chasing large 
numbers of false alarms without ever finding a true positive. 
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  In other machine learning applications, like spam, it is easy to correct/validate 
false positives or false negatives.  Other successful applications have been able to 
improve their performance over time because the user base can easily provide 
feedback.  Subsequently, this feedback can tune classifiers and correct datasets.  
Intrusion detection alerts are inherently difficult to evaluate [6].  Even when 
classification errors are discovered, it is not in a volume that is large enough to 
significantly improve a classifier performance or build a cleaner dataset.  
Spam classification also demonstrates that certain machine learning 
applications can benefit from an unbalanced cost mode.  In some cases, designers can 
gear an algorithm to err towards false negatives to avoid the more adverse cost of a 
false positive.  This skewing allows a machine-learned classifier to be employed in a 
real-world setting without burdening the user.  NID does not offer the opportunity for 
such a tradeoff. Both false positives and false negatives are extremely undesirable [6]. 
Network traffic demonstrates an enormous variability of benign traffic.  As 
Sommer and Paxson assert, it is “difficult to find stable notions of normality.”  Many 
of the traffic profiles are heavy-tailed distributions, where there are events that are 
significantly far away from the mean but only occur at infrequent times.  This means 
studies seeking to develop an accurate probability distribution would require an 
enormous amount of time and effort. The rapidly changing nature of network 
configurations would further impede a meaningful study. What the network looks like 
now, may not be what the network looks like after the installation of a new service, 
device, or a major connectivity change.  Furthermore, what is normal at one site, may 
not be normal at another site.  A study that does not consider how the experimental 
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network impacts the classifier will be doomed to low adoption.  Without a meaningful 
discussion on the nature of the network traffic, a scheme could fail to demonstrate the 
same classification accuracy or may not even be able to be implemented [6]. 
Many machine learning studies fail to account for how attackers operate.  
Sophisticated attackers study security research and develop ways to tune their tactics 
to evade detection.  This antagonistic relationship makes naive studies irrelevant 
when attackers can arbitrarily adjust their traffic characteristics that will be present in 
log data.  For instance, an attacker may pad their packet payloads so that the packet 
size appears less suspicious.  The padding does not interfere with the attack, but if a 
classifier has been trained to look for instances of small packet sizes, the modified 
packet may evade detection.  Therefore, any study needs to develop a classification 
scheme from the motivation and perspective of an attacker.  Ideally, the classification 
scheme needs to choose features that are invariant for a type of attack, so the attacker 
cannot easily adjust his/her technique.  Consideration should also be given on how a 
scheme could be defeated.  Even if an attacker can evade one security measure, it 
may present an opportunity for alternate security measures or methods to be used to 
detect the attack.  
Challenges with Intrusion Detection Datasets 
Arguably, the most significant challenge to intrusion detection research is the 
lack of sound publically available labeled datasets.  One reason for the absence is the 
difficulty in classifying and verifying network traffic to build the dataset in a clean 
manner.  As Sommon and Paxson assert the investment of building an experimental 
set-up is often more difficult than developing the detection scheme itself [6].  For 
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studies that built their own sets, privacy and security concerns typically prevent 
researchers from sharing their information with the community [8].  Currently, there 
are three publically available labeled datasets: the 1998/1999 DARPA Lincoln Lab 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset (DARPA-98/99), the Knowledge Discovery 
and Data Mining Cup 1999 dataset (KDD-99), and the Kyoto University 2006-2009 
Honeypot dataset (Kyoto2006+).  Many critical studies have shown these datasets 
have considerable issues, to include out-of-date attack paradigms, unrealistic traffic 
modelling, ambiguous labeling schemes, erroneously labeled data, and a significant 
lack of validation [1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].    
The DARPA-98/99 and the KDD-99 are the two most commonly used 
datasets, and they both have significant issues.  Both datasets are over ten years old; 
network bandwidth, applications and attacks have all changed significantly since the 
original studies.  Both the DARPA-98/99 and KDD-99 used simulated traffic that is 
supposed to be representative of a typical Air Force base.  Critical studies of these 
datasets have demonstrated, however, that the traffic is not representative of even the 
installation that it is supposed to model [9, 10].  Despite the obvious deleterious 
effects unrealistic simulations could have, the original DARPA study did not perform 
analysis on how the artificial nature of the simulated traffic affected their evaluation 
of various IDSs.  Many studies perpetuate this mistake and report findings without 
consideration of this glaring issue.  As McHugh asserts, “the burden is on the 
experimenter to show that the artificial environment did not affect the outcome of the 
experiment.” Furthermore, the categories of malicious data used in the datasets are 
often ambiguous.  The broad, attack-centric taxonomy does fail to describe clearly 
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from the IDS’s perspective what is alarming.  Tavallaee et al. demonstrated a serious 
lack of validation in both datasets that has led to errors, such as redundant records, 
dropped traffic records, etc.  While these two datasets are the most widely used and 
therefore the most criticized, it is worth noting that many of the homegrown datasets 
in intrusion detection studies repeat many of the same errors with respect to 
modelling, analysis, and validation [9]. 
Kyoto2006+ is a relatively new dataset that took an innovative approach in an 
effort to capture more realistic attack traffic.  In contrast with the scripted nature of 
the traffic in DARPA-98/99 and KDD-99, Kyoto2006+ used honeypots to collect real 
attack information and it injected traffic from real servers (a mail and DNS server) to 
create the non-attack traffic.  In order to label the traffic, the creators of the data used 
a combination of a network IDS, host anti-virus and a shellcode detection tool known 
as Ashula [10].  The use of the Ashula tool offers an interesting aspect in the 
Kyoto2006+ labeled set: it allowed the researchers to demonstrate how effective their 
detection scheme is at detecting malicious traffic for which traditional IDS and host 
anti-viruses did not have a signature. This concept supports the underlying hope 
behind many machine learning studies that the classifier can generalize to detect new 
and previously unseen forms of malicious data. 
There are significant issues with the Kyoto2006+ dataset. First, the manner in 
which the creators injected normal traffic is problematic. They assumed that all 
injected traffic can be classified normal because they “observed that there is few [sic] 
attack data even if the server has received cyber attacks” [10].  As we will 
demonstrate later in this paper, this assumption can have disastrous effects depending 
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the researcher’ activity of interest and the learning technique which they apply to the 
dataset.  Furthermore, the proportions of injected traffic and type of inject traffic is 
completely unrealistic.  The authors of the dataset report 50,033,015 normal network 
transactions and 42,617,536 malicious ones.  As previously discussed, in reality the 
actual amount of normal traffic is orders of magnitude more than the malicious 
traffic.  The “normal traffic” is limited to two hosted services and the management 
traffic to the servers.  It lacks any client behavior such as peer-to-peer that could have 
serious effects on a classification scheme.  These issues mean that any parametric 
learning approach will fail to generalize to any real-world network.  In addition to 
labeling issues, there is no consideration on how sophisticated attackers act on 
honeypots.  There is research among the attack community on how to detect 
honeypots and ways to exploit them in a stealth manner [12, 11]. This lack of 
consideration means that the automated architecture may fail to detect certain 
hackers, and would incorrectly label certain network transactions as benign.  It also 
undermines the previous assumption that the captured traffic is representative of all of 
the possible attacks that the network will see in the “wild.”  Another issue is that the 
Ashula tool is no longer available for download, and its parent website, www.secure-
ware.com, is down.  Their 2009 paper does not discuss Ashula’ inner workings.  
Without any conversation on how Ashula works, situations in which it may not detect 
a type of exploit, or how it can be defeated, researchers cannot accurately claim that it 
detects all instances.  Finally, other papers that used the Kyoto2006+ dataset have 
demonstrated that it may contain errors [1].  Without an enduring effort at curating 
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the dataset, when a researcher finds a labeling error, there is no mechanism to 
disabuse the dataset for future studies. 
Previous Semi-Supervised Learning Work  
Semi-supervised learning techniques are an emerging area of research in 
intrusion detection.  In one of the earliest works, intrusion detection is modelled as a 
partially observable Markov decision-making process (POMDP) and uses a semi-
supervised approach (Expectation Maximization to the learn conditional probability 
distributions) in order to classify legitimate and misuse user behavior in a UNIX 
terminal [12].  In [13], a co-training method for intrusion detection is applied to the 
KDD-99 dataset.  In [1], the authors explored the use of non-parametric graph-based 
methods (Laplacian Eigenmaps and Laplacian Regularized Least Squares) on the 
Kyoto2006+ dataset. One of the promising aspects of their approach is that the 
authors do not have to make any assumptions about the probability distributions of 
the traffic. The paper also made an assertion that semi-supervised techniques could be 
used in practical real world settings, where a system administrator could build his/her 
own mixed labeled dataset by auditing a portion of existing normal traffic and 
performing some penetration testing. This comment is one of the motivations for this 
study.  
Cluster-then-label (CTL) SSL techniques have been applied to other domains 
with success.  The authors in [14] used CTL techniques successfully in three-
dimensional character recognition, and [15] demonstrated success in classifying eight 
datasets from the UC-Irvine Machine Learning Repository.  [16] provided a 
theoretical analysis on situations where a CTL approach provides a better error bound 
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than a pure supervised classifier, and situations where CTL techniques cannot 
perform any better.  At the time of this thesis, there appears to be no application of a 
CTL approach to intrusion detection. 
Previous Scan Detection Work 
Numerous supervised learning and data mining studies have been applied to 
scanning.  [17] developed the Stealth Probing and Intrusion Correlation Engine 
(SPICE), which uses a Bayes network approach to compute the probability that a 
network flow record is a scan.  [18] developed a method based on sequential 
hypothesis testing (SHT). Their scheme, Threshold Random Walk, evaluates a 
probability ratio for each connection 
 rscanner
 rnon scanner
  per remote host, and performs SHT 
until it has seen enough connections to classify the host as a scanner or non-scanner 
based on two predefined thresholds. [19] proposed innovative clustering and mining 
technique to visualize scans and attack data. 
Simon et al., from UMN MINDS, presented an innovative data-mining 
approach to scan detection [20]. Their approach performs heavy preprocessing of 
network flow records, transforming them in to a dataset that consists of rich features 
before using a supervised learner. These features, such as the number of distinct 
internal IP addresses touched by a single external IP, intuitively correspond to 
characteristics of scans that are useful in distinguishing them from non-scan traffic.  
After preprocessing, the authors train a rule-learning algorithm known as Repeated 
Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER). This thesis replicates 
their working using the same feature set and classifier in order to gauge the 
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effectiveness of their method and use it as a benchmark to evaluate the semi-
supervised technique.  
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Chapter 3: Method 
Supervised Classifier 
Rule-based algorithms, which follow an algorithmic paradigm similar to 
decision trees, are an easy to use family of algorithms for inductive inference.  In 
essence, these rule-based algorithms create a sequence of rules, where each rule 
attempts to cover and separate out as many instances of one class of data as possible.  
Different versions of algorithms vary in the heuristics that they use to select rules and 
the logic to prune rules to avoid overfitting.  The most significant drawback of rule-
based algorithms is their tendency to overfit to the dataset on which they were trained 
[21].   
RIPPER is one of the most popular rule-based classifiers, due to optimizations 
for fast runtime and pruning logic that minimizes overfitting effects [22].  It runs in 
 ( (        time, opposed to the popular decision tree algorithm C4.5, which runs 
in  (    time [21].  The resultant classifier RIPPER produces is intuitive to the 
human reader; it essentially is a series of “if-then” statements, which could be used in 
existing signature-based IDS. RIPPER can handle datasets that are not linearly 
separable.  It does not require a priori knowledge of the underlying statistical 
distribution of the dataset.  This fact allows research to avoid making erroneous 
assumptions.  In addition, it is robust to noise, both errors in classifications of the 
training instances and errors in the feature values that describe these instances [21].   
This property offers the user some latitude since building a flawless training set in 
NID is near impossible.  The pseudocode in Figure 4 explains RIPPER operations.  
Figure 5 explains the metrics and heuristics, which RIPPER uses. 
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Figure 4: RIPPER Pseudocode (adapted from [21] [22], [23]) 
 
Figure 5: RIPPER Metrics and Heuristics (Adapted from [22], [21]) 
Unsupervised Clustering  
  The unsupervised clustering method used in this thesis was k-means++.  K-
means++ is an optimized version of k-means.  It uses randomized seeding to increase 
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runtime performance (empirical studies have shown a performance speedup by factor 
2 to 10).  While finding the optimal clustering is NP-hard, k-means++ is guaranteed 
to be O(log(k)) competitive to the optimal solution [24].        
Semi-Supervised Method 
The experiments conducted in this thesis depart from the mainstream SSL 
approaches, which are either graph-based or based on a parametric mixture model, 
and explores “cluster-then-label” (CTL) SSL methods.  The overall intuition and 
assumption is that in a given domain similar instances tend to group together.  In this 
paradigm, first an unsupervised algorithm groups data points into clusters known as 
decision sets. Next, a supervised learning algorithm per cluster is trained on the 
labeled instances.  This supervised classifier is then transductively applied to the 
unlabeled instances within the decision set.  There are two ways to classify future 
instances. First, a CTL algorithm can map an instance to a decision set, then apply 
that set's supervised classifier.  Alternatively, the CTL algorithm can use a global 
classifier.  This global classifier is built after performing an additional iteration of 
supervised learning during the build portion of the algorithm (see Figure 6).  This 
thesis evaluated both variants, primarily focusing on the former. 
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Figure 6: Cluster-Then-Label Algorithm 
CTL offers several advantages over the other approaches. First, although CTL 
is similar to mixture-models, it is fundamentally more general.  It makes no 
assumption what the underlying distribution is for the populations of benign and 
malicious. As Zhu and Goldberg assert, if a poor model is assumed it could have 
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deleterious impact on classification [25].  Hu et al. demonstrated that network traffic 
and in particular malicious traffic can be heavy-tailed, which may exacerbate poor 
choices in models [26].  In addition, since this experiment injects malicious traffic, 
any supposition on a distribution would be fundamentally flawed and skewed from 
the true distribution.  
While there may be some similarities in mathematical reasoning between CTL 
decision sets and the manifold regularization of graph-based methods, the clustering 
methods employed in the CTL approach are mathematically simpler and 
computationally less expensive than the graph-based methods. As Goldberg et al. 
suggest, it follows a “wrapper” design paradigm, where multiple and previously 
established techniques can be used for the unsupervised and supervised steps of the 
algorithm without having to develop newer or more confusing techniques [14].  Since 
many of the machine learning and SSL algorithms are computationally expensive, a 
wrapper design paradigm allows the choice of optimized supervised and unsupervised 
implementations.  This flexibility enables CTL to process large datasets faster than 
other algorithms that have a greater runtime complexity.   
The need for an easy to interpret classifier goes beyond mere convenience.  
Some techniques like artificial neural networks (ANN) or support vector machines 
(SVM) may not offer much insight into what causes a particular instance to be 
detected.  It would be fallacious to subscribe to a “black box” mentality that assumes 
that once a classifier is in place it will continue to exhibit the same success rate.   
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Without insight into how something works, attackers could potentially run many 
variations of an attack against the same “black box” until they discover an undetected 
permutation.  Choosing a classifier that supports anti-forensic analysis is paramount. 
Cluster-then-label Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to provide theoretical background on situations 
where the CTL approach has a provably better error bound than a pure supervised 
approach.  In particular, this section will summarize Singh, Nowak and Zhu’s 
analysis of CTL error convergence rates.  This section will also highlight some of the 
implicit assumptions of the model that are subtle but have tremendous impact if not 
properly followed.   
Error Performance 
Singh et al.’s analysis provides the mathematical justification to why empirical 
evidence demonstrates that CTL appears to improve error performance in some cases 
but not in others.  Their core idea is based on a geometric understanding of how the 
labeled and unlabeled data are distributed.  In essence, if the individual clusters, 
which make a CTL decision set, are more discernable than the whole set of labeled 
data, then CTL SSL can yield higher accuracy rates than a pure supervised classifier.  
Figure 7 illustrates this concept; in portion in Figure 7a presents an omniscient view 
of two classes that exist in discernable dense clusters.  Unfortunately, the amount and 
distribution of the available labeled data in Figure 7b is not enough to accurately 
distinguish the boundary between the two classes.  Figure 7c shows that when 






Figure 7: a) Omniscient view of two classes, b) the whole set of labeled instances, 
c) the set of labeled and unlabeled instances (Adapted from [16]) 
Singh et al.’s proof consists of two major parts.  In the first part, Singh et al. 
establish a lower bound on the separation distance between clusters in order for data 
points to be sufficiently distinguishable; i.e. margin necessary to cluster instances 
with high probability ( (   
 
 
 ) into the correct decision set without any additional 
knowledge.  Figure 8 shows this bound, which relates the margin between clusters, γ, 
to the average density within a cluster.   
 
Figure 8: Margin-cluster Density Relationship 
Using this density relationship, Singh et al. prove the error performance by comparing 
the CTL algorithm to a “clairvoyant supervised learner.”  The clairvoyant supervised 
learner assumes there exists a pure supervised learning algorithm that has the best 
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possible knowledge of the data.  This clairvoyant learner is bounded by the 
underlying unavoidable error in the dataset, i.e. it cannot be improved.   
 
The authors then argue if a clairvoyant learner exists, then there is also a clairvoyant 
CTL SSL classifier for each set.  This clairvoyant CTL SSL classifier uses the same 
algorithm as the pure supervisory classifier, but instead of classifying instances for 
the entire dataset, the clairvoyant CTL SSL classifier only maps instances for its own 
cluster.  The error bound for the clairvoyant CTL SSL classifier is therefore the same 
as the pure supervisory classifier within that decision set. 
 
Singh et al. complete the proof by placing an upper bound on the accuracy of any 
CTL SSL classifier by showing how it is equivalent to the error of the clairvoyant 




The immediate conclusion is that as more unlabeled data, m, becomes available, the 
probability of clustering errors decreases, hence the error due to cluster mistakes 
decreases.  For problem domains with discernable boundaries, this means that the 
CTL SSL classifier can approach theoretical limits of accuracy with more unlabeled 
instances.  Finally, Singh et al, also demonstrated that while certain cases a CTL 
approach cannot improve performance, using a CTL does not provable degrade 
performance either [16].      
Practical Issues 
 Despite this optimistic implication, there are a number of practical issues 
arriving from the fundamental assumptions of the CTL model.  First, this CTL 
approach assumes “good” clustering behavior, where the unsupervised method used 
conforms to the discernable decision set margin assumption.  Unfortunately, it is far 
from obvious whether the unsupervised method will conform to this assumption.  As 
[27] demonstrated, a poor choice of clustering can result in the following 
degenerative situation.  In Figure 9, there are four clusters that naturally exist in a 
population.  As Figure 10 demonstrates, the choice of clustering method uses the CTL 
algorithm to mistake the true decision sets and then trains on the incorrect set of 
labeled instances.  Here complete linkage clustering erroneously links two disjoined 




Figure 9: An Example Population Consisting of Four Clusters (Adapted from 
[25])  
 
Figure 10: Hierarchical Clustering in Example Population (Adapted from [27]) 
The second issue is that the CTL algorithm assumes a “good” labeling 
distribution.  Typically, any supervised learning algorithm will require that the 
training dataset is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from the underlying 
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population.  While random sampling can ensure that samples are drawn i.i.d. from a 
population, there is no guarantee that the CTL algorithm will have enough labeled 
instances per cluster to accurately train each decision set classifier.  In a population 
with features that follow heavy tailed distributions, there may exist clusters with little 
or no labeled data.  Furthermore, certain classes in a population exist at any extreme 
disproportion to the majority class.  Thus, any sampling method, if not 
comprehensive enough, may not fully capture the minority class of interest.  As 
Chapter 6 will demonstrate, this issue was encountered during the evaluation.  One of 
the promises of SSL is that less labeled information needs to be collected, but it is 
unclear exactly how much less is needed.  With these issues in mind, a researcher 
may not be able to tell a prior if a dataset has enough labeled data, thus practical 
implementation may be forced to overestimate the volume of labeled traffic. This 
sobering reality limits how much effort an SSL approach saves over a pure 
supervisory approach in a real world setting.   
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Chapter 4: Dataset 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the intent and methodology used to create a labeled 
intrusion detection dataset.  First, the “ aradigm Development” section describes how 
this study created representative samples of stealth scans and the procedure by which 
those samples were vetted.  This chapter also explains the network set-up, 
implementation choices, and auditing procedures in an effort to be as transparent as 
possible.  This transparency is necessary, because the way the dataset was built could 
potentially influence the results of any study that uses it. 
Paradigm Development 
While it is common knowledge that advanced attackers will perform “slow-
and-low” stealthy scans, there is no authoritative source that exactly prescribes the 
perimeters by which attackers scan.  To develop a set of stealth scan profiles, I 
worked with a small group of four students who are members of the University of 
Maryland Cyber Security Club.  All have experience in ethical hacking and 
penetration testing; two of the students have professional experience.  Over a period 
of five weeks, we trained on the open-source scanning tool, nmap, and dissected how 
to best scan a network without being detected by traditional means.  Nmap is the most 
popular scanning tool in the security community, and it allows an unparalleled 
amount of control in setting parameters for scans.    
The profiles were developed with intent to determine how a well-resourced 
attacker would scan a network given a specific objective, a set of exploits to common 
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services and an operational window of no longer than month.  The one-month 
window was chosen because it corresponds to the time between major patch releases. 
Thus, an attacker could have an entire month to scan a target before it changes. Using 
nmap, these profiles were tested against an open-source instance of an IDS, Snort.  
Snort was set with the most stringent port scanning thresholds in order to ensure that 
the attack would be representative of a stealth scan.  In addition, small sets of the 
profiles were tested against the University's commercial intrusion prevention system 
(IPS).  
Not surprisingly, the scan profiles did not have to deviate significantly from 
default nmap settings to evade the IDS/IPS.  We investigated the two broad 
categorizes of port scanning based on the scan's intended target footprint: horizontal 
scans and vertical scans.  The main parameters of interest were the target ports and 
inter-packet timing.  We determined that it is possible to infer with good confidence 
detailed host information while sending a minimal amount of port probes over a long 
time interval.  Table 3 shows the tradeoff between scanning only the most common 
ports and the percentage of open services discovered.  Although the expected 
percentage of discovered open services may not equal 100%, the scans we developed 
have enough information to start planning how to exploit the services that are 
available.  Table 4 shows typical settings that were used to evade IDS detection.  
Additionally, data padding was used in some cases to further obscure detection. 
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Table 3: Percentage of Services Discovered (adapted from [4]) 
Expected discovery of open 
services  
k most popular TCP 
Ports 
k most popular UDP 
Ports 
10% 1 5 
20% 2 12 
30% 4 27 
40% 6 135 
50% 10 1075 
60% 18 2618 
70% 44 5157 
80% 122 7981 
85% 236 9623 
90% 576 11307 
95% 1558 13035 
99% 3328 15094 
100% 65536 65536 
 
Table 4: Typical Port Scan Settings 
 Typical Port Settings Typical Timing Settings 
Vertical 
Scans 
Top port (80), top 10 ports, top 
20 ports, top 100 ports, all 
well-known ports 
Min delay between packet {300s, 
350s, 400s}, max delay between 
packet {400s, 500s, 600s} 
Horizontal 
Scans 
Top port (80), top 3 ports, top 
10 ports, top 20 ports, top 100 
ports 
Min delay between packet {300s, 
350s, 400s}, max delay between 
packet {400s, 500s, 600s} 
 
In addition to vertical and horizontal scans, we investigated more advanced 
forms of scanning.  We included some instances of coordinated scans, where multiple 
scanners scan a set of targets.  In this paradigm, each scanner IP had a portion of the 
overall target network's IP addresses and ports.  This diffusion makes it harder for a 
human analyst to see the typical attack scheme in network logs.  We also investigated 
idle or “zombie” scans, where attackers use internal hosts to the target network.  In 
this case, we had trouble reliably scanning the target networks.  The limited literature 
on idle scanning suggests that this experience is not uncommon.  The idle scan model 
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requires zombie hosts to have a quiet traffic profile, an obsolete TCP/IP stack 
implementation, and reliable uptime [28].  Consequently, we did not include idle 
scanning in this study. 
Network Configuration 
With profiles developed, we scripted a network of 32 virtual machines (VMs) 
to scan two Class C subnets of a real production network and instrumented it to 
collect network flow records, pcap and Snort alerts (see Figure 11 below).  Although 
the experiment focused on network flow records, the other sources of information 
provided additional insight in case some inconsistency was found.  These VMs 
created two datasets from November through December 2013.   
Figure 11: Network Setup 





Figure 11: Network Setup 
Table 5: November Dataset Characteristics 
Duration 30  
Total Number of Raw Flows 12,986,232 97.367% 
Total Number of Injected Vertical Scan 
Flows 
4,868 0.036% 
Total Number of Injected Horizontal Scan 
Flows 
346,331 2.597% 
Total Number of Flows  13,337,431 100.000% 
   
Total Number of Raw Records 2,340,394 98.782% 
Total Number of Injected Vertical Records 4,308 0.182% 
Total Number of Injected Horizontal 
Records 
24,559 1.037% 
Total Number of "Noise records" 29,323 1.238% 
Total Number of Adjusted Attack Records 58,190 2.456% 
Total Number of Adjusted Raw Records 2,311,073 97.544% 
Total Number of Records 2,369,263 100.000% 
 
Table 6: December Dataset Characteristics 
Duration 9 Days  
Total Number of Raw Flows 5,025,058 93.143% 
Total Number of Injected Vertical Scan 
Flows 
35,349 0.655% 
Total Number of Injected Horizontal Scan 
Flows 
334,581 6.202% 
Total Number of Flows  5,394,988 100.000% 
   
Total Number of Raw Records 1,004,382 95.600% 
Total Number of Injected Vertical Records 24,093 2.293% 
Total Number of Injected Horizontal 
Records 
22,134 2.107% 
Total Number of "Noise records" 17,792 1.693% 
Total Number of Adjusted Attack Records 64,019 6.094% 
Total Number of Adjusted Raw Records 986,590 93.906% 





Table 7: January Dataset Characteristics 
Duration 28 Days  
Total Number of Raw Flows 24,839,005 98.410% 
Total Number of Injected Vertical Scan 
Flows 
19,085 0.076% 
Total Number of Injected Horizontal Scan 
Flows 
382,349 1.515% 
Total Number of Flows  25,240,439 100.000% 
   
Total Number of Raw Records 1,672,186 98.362% 
Total Number of Injected Vertical Records 14,384 0.846% 
Total Number of Injected Horizontal 
Records 
13,471 0.792% 
Total Number of "Noise records" 35,732 2.102% 
Total Number of Adjusted Attack Records 63,587 3.740% 
Total Number of Adjusted Raw Records 1,636,454 96.260% 




The University of Minnesota (UMN) Minnesota Intrusion Detection System 
(MINDS) method incorporates considerable expert knowledge as well as domain-
specific knowledge in producing the processed dataset.  Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 
enumerate the features that were calculated for this experiment, which was adapted 
from the UMN MINDS method.  The evaluation used these records, which consisted 
of a key (tuple of source ip, source port and destination port), plus the encoded 
feature set.  
Table 8: Record Key 
srcip   External IP, part of key 
srcport   Source port of external host, 0 for multiple source ports, part of key 




Table 9: Features of Basic Flow Characteristics 
Feature Description 
ndstip   Number of distinct internal IPs touched by the srcip  
ndstports   Number of distinct interal ports touched by the srcip  
avgdstips   Number of distinct internal IPs averaged over all destination ports 
touched by the srcip. 
maxdstips Maximum number of distinct internal IPs over all destination ports that 
the srcip touched 
 
Table 10: Features over All Destination Ports 
Feature   Description    
server ratio   Ratio of distinct internal IPs that provided the service that the 
srcip requested to ndstip.  
client ratio   The ratio of distinct internal IPs that requested service from the 
external IP to ndstip.   
nosrv ratio   The ratio of distinct internal IPs touched by the srcip that offered 
no service on dstport to any source during the observation period 
to ndstip.  
dark ratio   The ratio of distinct internal IPs that has been inactive during the 
experiment window to ndstip.   
blk ratio   The ratio of distinct internal IPs that were attempted connections 
to by the scrcip on a blocked port during the experiment to 
ndstip. 
p2p ratio   The ratio of distinct internal IPs that have actively participated 
in P2P traffic during the experiment window. 
 
Table 11: Feature on Individual Destination Ports 
Feature   Description    
i_ndstips   Number of distinct internal IPs touched by the srcip and specific 
dstport 
i_none ratio   Ratio of distinct internal IPs touched by the srcip and specific 
dstport that did not offer the service requested to i_ndstips 
i_dark ratio   Ratio of distinct internal IPs touched by the srcip and specific 
dstport that did not were not active to i_ndstips 
i_blk  ratio   Ratio of distinct IPs touched by the srcip to a specific specific 
blocked dstport to i_ndstips  
 
 Two implementation choices in the encoding of the feature set above could 
have had potential impact on this study.  First, the UMN method has an implicit 
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encoding of time.  The choice is up to the implementer when to calculate the statistics 
and how far back to calculate the statistics, based on the availability of storage and 
computation resources. Their implementation calculates the record every 20 minutes 
for up to a period of 3 days.  The size of their defended network limited how many 
days the UMN researchers could reasonable process in a given time.  As Simon et al. 
suggest, the more days evaluated, the more accurate the method will be [20].  This 
thesis evaluates the performance of the detection scheme using an evaluation window 
of 30 days, given the nature of the types of scans evaluated.  This choice seems 
reasonable given the advances in storage and processing big datasets; however, a 
practical implementation may need a significant amount of optimizations if the 
network is large. 
Second, since every record key consists of a source IP address, there was a 
potential for the VMs, which were constantly scanning, to have exaggerated statistics.  
As a result, each complete scan set from the 32 VMs was relabeled with a unique 
source IP, so that every scan attack seemed to come from a new IP.  This choice may 
be slightly artificial, since in the real world, there is potential for IPs to repeat scans 
on the same subnet.  However, this choice does represent an attack that is harder to 
distinguish than a scan attack that repeatedly targets the same network and has large 
statistics on the feature set above.      
Data Auditing 
All network flow records and processed records were entered into a 
PostgreSQL database, which enabled manual verification.  Network flow records and 
processed records were stored in separate tables based on whether they were from the 
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network of honeypots or the production network.  All records from the network of 
honeypots were labeled “scanner;” all records from the production network were 
initially labeled “non-scanner” and then scrutinized for error.  In particular, several 
different queries were used to better check for labeling errors. These queries included 
manually verifying the most frequent external IP addresses, checking external hosts 
that initiated flows with a ndstip feature greater than the number of active internal 
hosts during evaluation period, and checking external hosts that communicated to 
many well-known ports on the same internal host.  By combining the processed 
record with a filtered network flow table, many scans that were previously unlabeled 
became evident in the production set.  In Table 5, 6 and 7, the noise records are those 
records that were relabeled.  Notice that in November, the amount of noise records 
actually exceeds the injected traffic.   
Figure 12 shows an example of a scan that the queries above catch.  By some 
reorganization of the flow records, it is clear there is horizontal scan from one source 
IP to an entire subnet looking for hosts that have Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) 
services running.  RDP is an important Microsoft protocol that allows users to 
remotely access and control their PCs, and it is a popular target for malicious 
attackers that are seeking to gain quick control of a poorly administered computer.  
Records for the scanner IP address (before it was encrypted) reveal that it belongs to 
one of the major ISPs on the East Coast and is most likely a home user.  Based off 
this information, there is no logical explanation why one home user would be seeking 








Chapter 5:  Experiment 
Experimental Parameters 
This thesis used a series of trials to evaluate the performance of the UMN 
MINDS algorithm as well as the CTL algorithm.  The evaluated implementation of 
CTL used k-means++ with simple Euclidian distance and RIPPER for the supervised 
classifier with two rounds of optimization.  Two trials were executed using only the 
control algorithm: one with the network of honeypots traffic naively injected and one 
with records adjusted. These trials demonstrate the effect that noise may have when 
building a classifier with injected attack data.  Next, the datasets were broken into sets 
of randomly selected labeled instances mixed with unlabeled instances.  The 
motivation behind creating these sets is to compare the CTL algorithm performance 
against a pure supervisor and to illustrate how much labeled data would be needed to 
achieve acceptable levels of accuracy.  Trial I attempts to show how a practical 
approach a security administrator might take to labeling a dataset, for instance from a 
company network.  In this setting, the administrator combines penetration testing data 
with the existing logs.  The administrator would have audited only the most frequent 
hosts, which he/she would label as scanner or non-scanner as appropriate.  In addition 
to varying the proportions of labeled traffic, we varied the number of clusters across 
all CTL implementations 
Tables 12, 13 and 14 capture the the experimental parameters that were used 
in each trial for the test and control cases. 
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Table 12: Experimental Parameters over Supervised Trial Cases 















2,369,263 28,867 287,974 2,369,263 
B Adjusted NOV; 
fully labeled 
10-CV 2,369,263 58,190 287,974 2,369,263 
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Table 13: Experimental Parameters over CTL Trial Cases 






















 DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
{2-90} 1,781,360 43,700 234,221 2,369,263 





labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
{2-90} 1,194,064 29,479 175,645 2,369,263 
E 25% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances, mixed  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
{2-90} 607,608 15,160 108,284 2,369,263 
F 10% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances,  mixed  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
{2-90} 254,952 6,352 57,895 2,369,263 
G 5% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances, mixed  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
  137,755 3,515 36,693 2,369,263 
H 1% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances, mixed  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
{2-90} 43,183 1,228 15,333 2,369,263 
I top 30 benign, top 5 





{2-100} 302,300 32,303 35 2,369,263 
J 1% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances plus 
injected labeled  scan 












Table 14: Experimental Parameters over CTL Control Cases 
















Total Size of 
Training set 




 DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
N/A 1,781,360 43,700 234,221 1,781,360 





labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
N/A 1,194,064 29,479 175,645 1,194,064 
E_control 25% randomly 
selected only 
labeled instances  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
N/A 607,608 15,160 108,284 607,608 
F_control 10% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances,  
mixed  from 
NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
N/A 254,952 6,352 57,895 254,952 
G_control 5% randomly 
selected only 
labeled instances  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
N/A 137,755 3,515 36,693 137,755 
H_control 1% randomly 
selected only 
labeled instances  
from NOV 
DEC, fully 
labeled;  JAN, 
fully labeled 
N/A 43,183 1,228 15,333 43,183 
I_control top 30 benign, 
top 5 scanners, 





N/A 302,300 32,303 302,300 302,300 
J_control 1% randomly 
selected labeled 
instances plus 
injected labeled  
scan traffic, 










Each trial was evaluated with the following measures: 
 
 
Figure 13: Performance Measures 
 The true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), and false 
negative (FN) are given by Table 15.  Recall, also known as sensitivity, corresponds 
to the relative frequency of correctly classified scanner instances.  Precision captures 
the proportion of correctly classified scanner instances.  The F-measure captures the 
balance between recall and precision, so that an ideal classifier that has a low rate of 
false positives and false negatives will achieve a F-measure close to one.  It is worth 
noting that the ROC score (sensitivity versus false positive rate), which is popular 
measure, was not calculated.  We did not use the ROC score because the balance 
between the true positive rate and false positive rate was not a monotonic function of 
some threshold in this experiment.  Thus, ROC curves did not add any meaningful 
insight into a classifier’s performance beyond what was already captured by the 
metrics above [29].       
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Table 15: Classification Matrix (Adapted from [20]) 
 Classified As Scanner Classified as Not Scanner 
Actual Scanner TP FN 
Actual Non-scanner FP TN 
 
McNemar's test was used for testing statistical significance [30].  Unless 
explicitly stated below, all trials in this test showed statistical distinction from their 
control, with the probability of Type I error < 0.5% . 
CTL Implementation 
There is no off-the-shelf program with CTL already implemented.  I 
implemented the main portions of CTL in Java, which enabled the use of the Weka 
machine learning library.  Weka has implementations of RIPPER and k-means++, 
and a well-documented API.   
Tests were executed on a 64-bit virtual machine with 16 GB of RAM, 8 x 




Chapter 6:  Results and Discussion 
The first two trials demonstrate that naively injected traffic into a dataset 
without verification can have disastrous results. In Table 16, the first iteration of Trial 
A using the unrectified NOV dataset showed high accuracy in a 10 fold cross-
validation test.  Using Trial A's classifier, it was then evaluated against the adjusted 
NOV dataset, where it produced 29,317 more false negatives. RIPPER is theoretically 
tolerant of noise, but this property has limits.  If the amount of training data that is 
mislabeled as “normal” is on the order of the injected attack traffic, then the 
algorithm will overfit to the injected traffic.  
Table 16: Supervised Trials 
 Spec Acc Precision  Recall/sens Fm 
Trial A, 10-CV 0.999998 0.999990 0.999861 0.999307 0.999584 
Trial A, Adjusted 
NOV full 
0.999998 0.987616 0.999861 0.495807 0.662898 
Trial B 1.000000 0.999992 1.000000 0.999656 0.999828 
 
The general trend in the results from trials C-J is that the CTL algorithm is 
more sensitive to the choice in number of clusters than the theoretical background 
would suggest (see Figure 14).  Trials C-H and J in particular exhibited this behavior 
(Figures 14, 15, 16, and 18).  The CTL implementation consistently failed to 
outperform the control when the number of clusters was not ideal, and in some cases 
the CTL performance was marginally poorer.  For most trials, the ideal number of 
clusters is around 50.  In this range (30 to 70), the CTL method will typically 
outperform the pure supervisory algorithm in all measures.  For trials C-H and J this 
performance increase was marginal compared to the control; for trial I (Figure 17) the 
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performance increase was significant.
 





Figure 15: Improvement from December Trial H (1 % Labeled) 
 








Figure 18: Improvement from December Trial J (1 % random with injected 





When the cluster assignment is not ideal, the CTL algorithm typically has 
poor sensitivity, therefore a high false negative rate, compared to the control.  The 
high false negative rate is primarily due to inherent disproportion between scan and 
non-scan classes.  Even though the sampling method conformed to the i.i.d. 
imperative, because such a small percentage of scan traffic is present in the dataset, 
the sampling procedure did not capture enough instances to accurately train each 
decision set classifier.  To illustrate this phenomenon, Figure 19, 20, and 21 show the 
number of instances of each class label from a 1% randomly selected training set and 
from a full month test set.   
 
 





Figure 20: Proportions of Training and Test Set Scan Traffic per cluster 
 
Figure 21: Proportions of Training and Test Set Scan Traffic per Cluster (Scaled 
Between 0 To 2500) 
It becomes clear in Figure 21 that there are certain clusters in the training set 
that never received a sufficient amount of labeled scan traffic for RIPPER to work 
properly.  Table 17 shows that there are a few clusters that experience little to no 
scans in the training set but experience a high number of scans in the test set.  Since 
RIPPER is seeking to separate out the minority (scan) class on its distinguishing 
features, if RIPPER does not train on enough representative minority class samples, 
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the algorithm will produce a large amount of false negatives.  While it is obvious that 
any supervised algorithm performs better with more training data, since the 
proportion of normal traffic is much greater than the proportion of attack traffic, 
simple sampling is not enough.  In situations where the number of clusters is small, it 
may actually be better to inject more attack traffic than what occurs at natural 
proportions.  This skewing of the data set helps to induce the proper bias for the 
classifier.  Finally, if there are too many clusters, the false negative rate also becomes 
high.  This problem is caused by the CTL algorithm subdividing an ideal decision 
cluster into multiple subpar clusters.  Since the subpar clusters have little labeled 
instances, their internal cluster classifier may default to majority voting.  Any future 
instance will be labeled with the majority class label (i.e. non-scanner); therefore, 
subdividing an ideal decision cluster may result in unlabeled scanner instances being 




Table 17: Number of Scans Per Cluster in Test and Training Sets  
Cluster Number of labeled Scan instances in the 
training set 
Number of Scan instances in the 
test set 
1 14 668 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 0 
5 0 20 
6 1 106 
7 0 0 
8 442 8310 
9 0 0 
10 0 0 
11 0 0 
12 37 3046 
13 0 0 
14 0 0 
15 0 0 
16 0 0 
17 0 0 
18 0 0 
19 75 3623 
20 0 0 
21 0 0 
22 0 0 
23 0 0 
24 0 0 
25 0 0 
26 291 22634 
27 361 19248 
28 0 0 
29 7 535 
30 0 0 
 
As confirmation of the effects of injecting more scan traffic, trial J (Figure 18) 
consists of a mixed data set comprised of a random selection of 1% of the labeled 
NOV traffic and all the labeled traffic from 23 dedicated scanners (both the injected 
scan records and records that were discovered in the dataset during auditing).  While 
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trial J ran with a lower false negative rate, it is still sensitive to the choice of cluster 
numbers.    
Despite only showing marginal performance gains in trial C-H and J, trial I 
showed more promising results for a real world implementation.  Here the 
performance gains were significant.  Before the trial, I conjectured that this choice of 
the top 30 I  addresses for the “normal” labeled portion may skew the classifier.  
Most of the IP addresses on the targeted subnet are servers, but in the network flows 
associated with the top 30 IP addresses, the UMD internal hosts are primarily acting 
as clients.  Surprisingly, the choice of top 30 benign IP addresses does not skew the 
data much in the CTL approach.  While there was no significant impact in this study, 
this choice may affect another set of malicious activity in an unintended way.  
However, this technique does offer hope that in a practical implementation a security 
administrator would only have to audit a small amount of the most frequently seen IP 
addresses in order to build an adequate classifier. 
Interestingly, the supervised classifier in each cluster has fewer rules when the 
number of clusters increases.  For implementations with the largest number of 
clusters, the decision set supervised classifier is just majority voting, i.e. traffic gets 
labeled with the label of the class that makes up the majority of that cluster.  This 
behavior reinforces the idea the data for this attack type behaves “nicely” and 
naturally occurs in close-nit clusters, for the optimal k.  A practical real world 
implementation could exploit the natural clustering by calculating a large number of k 
clusters, and then labeling each centroid with the majority class label.  Future 
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instances could then be classified using a nearest neighbor search on the cluster 
centroids.   
Some analysis was conducted to assess the impact that domain-specific 
knowledge has on classification accuracy.  Some of the features require extensive 
encoding of a priori knowledge such as the set of block ports per host.  Ideally, smart 
feature selection could still have good performance without extensive amounts of 
overhead.  While some initial research showed potential, the analysis was halted 
because of some inherent limitations.  First, in the January dataset, there is a spike in 
the prevalence of cloud services that use protocols communicating on multiple 
registered ports (1024 < registered ports < 30k).  This spike makes it difficult to 
determine if vertical scans are being performed on certain hosts without logic that 
checks if that port on a host is open, closed or filtered.  Furthermore, it started to 
become apparent that rules the RIPPER was learning rules that were specific to the 
evaluation network.  For instance, one of the rules RIPPER developed accurately 
capture the number of distinct IP addresses that were active on the subnet during the 
evaluation window, but this number may not generalize to another subnet with a 
different distinct number of IP addresses.  While the domain-specific knowledge 
requires some overhead, the way the statistics are calculated do allow it to generalize 
better to other subnets.       
There are some minor issues that are network specific.  On our test network, 
the network logs time stamps did not always provide the necessary accuracy to state 
which external IP was a server or a client.  The router appears to arbitrarily order 
complimentary network flows with identical timestamps; therefore, our 
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implementation defaulted to labeling external IP addresses as clients when the time 
stamps were equal and the external port was outside the well-known and registered 
range.  This way of handling identical time stamps could introduce noise, and the 
approach described in this thesis could exhibit better performance on more accurate 
logs.  Also, this lack of fidelity weakens distance measures.  In every situation, where 
an external host cannot be deterministically declared as a client or server, the 
implementation defaults to client.  As a result, certain statistics like client ratio, have 
few nonzero entries.  A high occurrence of a default value will make the Euclidean 
distance between two disparate instances seem smaller than if the distance was 
calculated with the feature was omitted.       
The performance of trial A and B exhibited better performance than what was 
originally reported in the UMN MINDS study.   This difference is most likely due to 
our study using a 30-day evaluation window.  Also, this study used two focused 
subnets with minimal peer-to-peer traffic as opposed to the UMN study which used 
records from the entire campus.   
Unfortunately, the base-rate fallacy still limits an adoption of this approach. 
While some iterations did achieve an accuracy that may be acceptable (> 99.5%), 
most iterations did not and a user of this approach would have to perform extensive 
evaluation to find the optimal number of clusters.  In addition, auditing the existing 
traffic for the presence of noise to a specific attack type requires sizable analysis.  For 
scanning, it is verbose enough to identify after some initial processing.  Other attack 
paradigms may not be so accommodating. Without this extensive auditing, the 
accuracy may fall to a level where the base-rate fallacy prevents its use.   
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Finally, a pleasant surprise came from a mistake in the way one of the datasets 
was created.  When creating the mixed label set for Trial J, the original test did not 
use the correct file with both labeled and unlabeled instances.  The CTL 
implementation was executed on a dataset set that on only contained labeled data 
(Figure 22).  In this context, this classifier is not acting in as a semi-supervised 
learner but as a two-stage supervised classifier: clustering on the labeled instances in 
the first stage and pure supervised learning within the clusters in the second.  This 
two-stage classifier exhibited high performance across all numbers of clusters.   
While a full analysis of this approach is beyond this thesis, one potential explanation 
that RIPPER is experiencing a performance gain in choosing how to divide the 
instances based on the feature values.  One way to interpreted RI  ER’s output is as 
a function that maps an instance based on a series of conditional probabilities.  
RIPPER uses a greedy algorithm to select dividing points in the values of a feature’s 
domain.  In most implementations there appears to be no advanced statistics on 
continuous values, just sorting and selection.  When restricted to subsets of the 
instances, RIPPER may be better able to learn dividing points since there is less likely 
to be variance and skewness in the range of a feature’s values within a cluster.  A 
two-stage classifier offers hope that rule-based and decision tree algorithms can be 
used in domains like intrusion detection where perfect knowledge of underlying 





Figure 22: Performance of a Two-stage Classifier  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
This thesis illustrated how CTL SSL algorithms can build classifiers with 
comparable accuracy with a fraction of the labeling effort as traditional supervised 
learning, provided the number of clusters is ideal.  Performance gains vary, but in 
general the trend is that at the ideal cluster value they will do better than the 
supervised counterpart.  While lending promise to security researchers, enthusiasm 
for SSL needs to be tempered with consideration for practical issues such as noise in 
the normal traffic.  Poor clustering can actually slightly degrade performance.  
Careful consideration should also be given for the choice unsupervised and 
supervised learners and their parameters.  
There are numerous avenues for future work.  First, a comprehensive 
evaluation of CTL using other supervised and unsupervised learning methods with 
different heuristics and distances measures should be performed.  The choice of 
RIPPER was driven by the need for interpretable results, speed, and comparison to 
existing measures. The performance gain for RIPPER may not be as pronounced as it 
is for other algorithms.  The theoretical analysis suggests that the CTL algorithm 
should have a markedly better performance than a pure supervised algorithm given 
enough unlabeled data.  That being stated, RIPPER is not as constrained as other 
approaches, such as SVM.  It may stand to reason that an application that lends itself 
to SVM or other linear discriminative methods may have better performance using a 
CTL approach.   
For unsupervised clustering, the Euclidean distance was the only distance 
measure evaluated here.  The Euclidean distance does not always perform the best.  
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Certain low variance features, like client ratio, weaken un-weighted measures of 
distance.  Thus, there is potential when using Euclidean distance measures in a set 
with a large number of features or many similar valued features that all instances may 
appear close.  In this situation, other weighted distances and compensated distance 
measures can account for features where the domain lacks variance or have missing 
values.  These techniques might be more appropriate here.        
While initially a mistake and outside the scope of this thesis, a two-stage 
approach shows promise.  In particular, it may be better able to handle imbalanced 
datasets or datasets with proportions of classes that deviate from the natural 
population.  A two-stage approach warrants further investigation.      
Finally, this approach should be evaluated on other attack paradigms and 
datasets to see how the traffic characteristics of different attacks affect detection in 
network flow data.  Scanning produces many network flow records; so even before 
preprocessing, there are many instances within a dataset to train a machine learning 
algorithm.  Other sets of activity may prove too difficult to detect accurately without 
additional information sources.  Related to this study, more research should focus on 
how evidence of scanning can be used in conjunction with other evidence to detect 
other sets of activities.  While Lane’s work in modelling  OMD  in order to detect 
UNIX terminal misuse is a start, a multi-disciplinary approach should cover detection 
for all know threat frameworks [12].  An advanced hacker conducts scanning in a 
radically different manner than the way a worm conducts its automated scans, so 
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